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The European Parliament: From a Human Rights 
Watchdog to a Responsible Decision Maker? 
 
 
Tineke Strik∗  
1. Introduction 
Elspeth was already involved in the European asylum and migration policy before a 
legal basis was established in the Treaty of Amsterdam. With her commitment to the 
ILPA proposals,1 she contributed to important principles that still guide European 
standards. I would like to reflect on twenty years EU asylum and migration policy from 
a point of view of democratic control. Since the beginning of this century, the Euro-
pean Union has been working towards common rules on legal migration for third coun-
try nationals and a European Common Asylum System. Now, two decades later, this 
process has resulted in an impressive number of first generation directives (and some 
regulations) and a number of additional or recast-directives in this field. During the 
negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam, where Member States decided to establish a 
legal basis for legislation on asylum and migration at the European level, they appeared 
quite hesitant to immediately give up their veto and to share their competences with 
the European Parliament. As a result, the first generation instruments were to be esta-
blished by the consultation procedure, where unanimity was required in the Council 
and the European Parliament was left with a purely advisory role. This exceptional 
procedure, which also limited the competences of the Court of Justice, would last for 
a transition period of five years, after which the Council could decide by unanimity to 
apply the communitarian regime to this policy area.2 The Parliament gained co-decision 
power in the field of irregular migration and border control in December 2004, one 
year later extended to the field of asylum. It is only since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 that the Parliament has to give its consent to legisla-
tion on regular migration.  
During my PhD-research on the decision-making process of the first two directi-
ves in this field,3 I found that the Parliament’s direct influence on those instruments 
was very limited. It is to be expected that the impact of this procedural anomaly during 
the crucial first exercise of standardising, must have remained on the legislation adop-
ted under co-decision, as new proposals built on the legislation it was kept out. In this 
contribution, I will briefly summarize my findings on the role of Parliament during the 
adoption of asylum and migration instruments during the consultation procedure. Af-
                                                        
∗  Associate professor, Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Since 
July 2019, Strik is an MEP for the Greens, member of the committees LIBE and AFET. 
1  Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA). For the proposals see: https://www.ilpa.org. 
uk/pages/publications.html. 
2  Title IV of the EC-Treaty, Article 67and 68. 
3  The Family Reunification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
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terwards, I will analyse how the role of Parliament has changed over time, paying at-
tention to its position as well as its strategy, using the Returns Directive as a case-study. 
While doing so, I will highlight how the shift from the Union towards the external 
dimension of asylum and migration policies, where intergovernmental cooperation re-
vived, and how these policies impeded effective parliamentary control. This brings me 
to some final words on the way forward for a strong, transparent and rights-based 
European Parliament.  
2. The Amsterdam Period: The Watchdog  
In my dissertation, I analysed the formation process of the Family Reunification Di-
rective and the Asylum Procedures Directive, which laid the foundation for an impor-
tant part of the current EU migration legislation.4 Both directives have been negotiated 
during the first years of this millennium, after the Treaty of Amsterdam had laid down 
the legal basis for asylum and migration legislation in May 1999.5 On the Family Re-
unification Directive, the Council negotiated from the beginning of 2000 to September 
2003.6 After two years the Belgian Presidency concluded that the Council had reached 
a deadlock and asked the Commission to present a new proposal, including the com-
promises that had been achieved and solutions for the controversies.7 The new propo-
sal, which left more room for manoeuvre for the Member States, was accepted as a 
sound basis by the Member States.8 Nevertheless it took more than a year to adopt the 
directive.9 The process towards the adoption of the Asylum Procedures Directive had 
a similar pattern. More than a year after presentation of the first proposal in October 
2000, the Belgian Presidency submitted a request to the Commission to draft a new 
proposal, accompanied by a number of principles that the proposal should adhere to.10 
After the Commission had presented its proposal mid-2002, the Council reached a 
political agreement on 30 April 2004, the day before the accession of ten new EU 
Member States.11 As it unsuccessfully tried to reach a common list of safe countries of 
origin, it took until December 2005 before the Council decided to adopt the directive, 
which included a procedure for adopting a common list in the future.12  
                                                        
4  T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal en Europees niveau, Den 
Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011. More information on the study under ‘Assessing the negotia-
tion process: methodology’. 
5  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and certain related acts – Final Act, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0115. 
6  See the first proposal of the Commission, COM(1999)638, 1 December 1999 and the second, 
COM(2000)624, 10 October 2000, released after the European Parliament had adopted its resolution. 
7  Presidency Conclusions – Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01. 
8  COM(2002)225, 2 May 2002. 
9  The Directive on the right to Family Reunification, 2003/86, OJ 3 October 2003, L 251/12. 
10  See the first proposal, COM(2000)278, 24 October 2000 and Presidency Conclusion no. 41, Laeken, 
SN 300/1/01 REV 1.  
11  See the revised proposal COM(2002)326, 18 June 2002; see the agreement 8771/04 ASILE 33, 30 
April 2004. 
12  Asylum Procedures Directive, 2005/85, OJ 13 December 2005, L 326/13. 
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Due to the limitations of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the decision making process 
concentrated around the Commission and Council.13 The Commission took the initia-
tive for the draft directives and acted as advisor and mediator during the negotiations 
at the Council.14 The principle of unanimity in the Council on Justice and Home Affairs 
-matters and the limited role of the European Parliament paved the way for a dominant 
role for national interests. As every single Member State needed to give its consent, it 
had the power to insist on certain amendments, which often contradicted the interests 
of the Commission.15 This intergovernmental approach impeded the institutionalisa-
tion of an EU migrant inclusion policy.16 Whereas the Commission mainly defended 
the aim of harmonisation at a high protection level for migrants, the ministers of Inte-
rior or Justice in the Council primarily aimed for maintenance of their national legisla-
tion and preferably also their national sovereignty. Harmonisation as such was not re-
cognised as being in their national interest, despite official declarations that claimed the 
opposite.17 The negotiation table hence transformed into a ‘market of optional provi-
sions’ for which the delegations’ actions were mutually supportive. This exchange of 
amendments only functioned well regarding proposals which lowered the level of pro-
tection, as they did not imply any additional obligations for the Member States.  
The influence of the European Parliament on the decision-making process had 
been minimal. As the Council had the final say, it drastically changed the proposals of 
the Commission by lowering the standards and creating more discretion for the Mem-
ber States. The amendments of the European Parliament, which merely supported the 
Commission, were practically ignored. The Commission only accepted these amend-
ments insofar as this did not undermine the support for its own proposal by the Mem-
ber States. It therefore only accepted amendments, which narrowed the personal scope 
or did not lead to additional obligations for Member States. The Council did not make 
an effort to involve the Parliament or to take its amendments seriously. The gap in 
position between the Parliament and the Council was even broader than the one be-
tween the Commission and the Council. This made the Parliament use its competence 
to bring both directives to the Court of Justice, requesting it to annul certain provisions 
of the directives. In the case of the Family Reunification Directive, the judgment Par-
liament against Council has impacted the meaning of the directive. In that judgment, the 
Court showed the difference with Article 8 ECHR, by making clear that the right to 
family reunification leaves no discretion for the Member States regarding sponsors who 
                                                        
13  The legal basis for the Asylum Procedures Directive was Article 63 (1) (d) and the basis for the Family 
Reunification Directive was Article 63 (3) (a) EC-Treaty.  
14  Most of the negotiations took place in the Working Group consisting of governmental experts. The 
next higher level was Scifa, consisting of the managers of the department involved, and the highest 
level of officials was COREPER, where the heads of the Permanent Representatives (PR) had to reach 
an agreement before it could be referred to the Council of Ministers. The Council could refer the text 
back to the JHA-Council, where experts of the PR solved the outstanding questions and problems of 
a more technical nature. These were the most informal meetings, without translators. See Strik 2011, 
p. 45-49.  
15  Strik 2011, p. 391-393. 
16  See also A. Geddes, ‘Lobbying for migrant inclusion in the European Union: new opportunities for 
transnational advocacy?’, 7:4 JEPP 2000, p. 632-649, at p. 634. 
17  See for instance the Tampere conclusions of 1999, where the European Council expressed the objec-
tive of harmonisation of asylum and migration policy, Council document no. 200/1/99. 
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fulfill the conditions allowed by the directive. But even if these conditions are not ful-
filled, they have to perform an individual assessment in the light of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, taking into account all relevant circumstances and interests.18 In 
the case of the Asylum Procedures Directive, where the exclusive competence of the 
Council to adopt a common list of safe third countries was challenged, Parliament has 
made the establishment of common lists of safe third countries more difficult, as the 
Court decided that such list would need the consent of the Parliament in the framework 
of co-decision.19 This impact is still relevant during the current negotiations on safe 
third country concepts and common lists in the framework of the Procedures Regula-
tion.20  
The limited impact of the Parliament also reduced the opportunities for the NGOs, 
as they exerted most influence during the preparation stage carried out by the Com-
mission and the consultation stage involving the European Parliament. Certain provi-
sions in the proposals of the Commission and opinions of the Parliament were identical 
to the proposals of the NGOs and UNHCR. The texts that the NGOs and UNHCR 
had successfully promoted towards the Commission and Parliament were however de-
leted or weakened by the Council, or transferred to the preamble of the directives. As 
the institutional context of that time had made the Council extremely powerful, the 
final outcome of the NGO lobbying was close to zero.21 After adoption of both direc-
tives, the NGOs successfully advocated for an action for annulment by the European 
Parliament before the Court of Justice. Their lobbying activities hence resulted in some 
influence prior to and after the Council negotiations, but hardly any during the actual 
decisions taken by the Council. 
3. The Lisbon Period 
Fundamentalists versus Pragmatists 
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, co-decision procedures became the rule (with 
some exceptions) for JHA-legislation.22 The switch from consultation to co-decision, 
combined with the abolishment of the right of veto for the Member States, has signif-
icantly changed the position of Parliament. As the Member States could no longer ig-
nore the Parliament, member of Parliament (MEPs) suddenly became an object of 
lobby for the national representatives. But the new power also changed the approach 
of political groups. Before, the consultation procedure combined with the simple ma-
jority rule within Parliament had enabled the development of confrontational positions 
towards the Council, as the Parliament could disclaim any responsibility in the policy 
                                                        
18  CJEU 27 June 2006, C-540/03, Parliament against Council. 
19  CJEU 6 May 2008, C-133/06, Parliament against Council. 
20  On 13 July 2016, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on the reform of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. The Commission proposed to replace the Asylum Procedures Directive with a 
regulation COM (2016) 467 final. 
21  Strik 2011, p. 402-405. 
22  See Title V of the TFEU. With the Lisbon Treaty, this procedure is defined as the ‘ordinary legislation 
procedure’. 
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outcomes.23 Smaller political groups were more visible and more successful, as they 
managed to mobilise the entire LIBE committee (European Parliament's Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs). Rather than a left-right division, Ripoll 
Servent observed a cleavage between those advocating liberty-oriented policies and 
those supporting the more security-oriented position of Commission and Council.24 It 
resulted in a generally liberal voting record on irregular migration and asylum legisla-
tion. The shift towards co-decision worked out well for the moderate big parties: the 
conservative European People’s Party (EPP), which often shared its position with the 
Council, became a key player in negotiations, necessary for reaching the required ma-
jorities. The group formed grand coalitions with the Socialists and Democrats Party 
(S&D), thus marginalizing smaller party groups. Their changing positions also seem 
closely linked to the increased authority and responsibility of the Parliament, which 
made the two groups realize that in order to be effective and not to run the risk that 
legislation would be dropped, it needed to propose amendments that were acceptable 
to the Council. The shift towards co-decision thus led to more restrictive positions of 
the Parliament on asylum and migration legislation.25 Acosta criticized this ‘all-to-eager 
acceptance of a deficient piece of legislation’, referring to Parliament’s position in the 
Returns Directive. The reasoning that it is better to have something rather than nothing 
at all, runs the risk that the power remains with the Council.26 In that light, Acosta but 
also other authors point at the tendency of MEPs to aim at achieving an agreement 
with the Council in the first reading, which does not serve the interest of a more dem-
ocratic and transparent European Union.27 Yet, the role of the European Parliament 
is central to the criticism on the lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the 
EU, as Parliament is in the best position to address the democratic deficit through its 
role in the decision-making process.  
Returns Directive: Putting the New Rule to the Test 
The first acid test for the meaning of the new position of Parliament was formed by 
the negotiations on the Returns Directive, which has been comprehensively analysed 
by Lutz, representing the Commission in that process.28 According to Lutz, this pro-
cedural change prevented the Member States from agreeing relatively easily on a wa-
tered down text with very limited added value.29 The strengthened position of the Par-
liament made the achievement of an agreement significantly more difficult, but it also 
                                                        
23  A. Ripoll Servent, ‘Playing the Co-Decision Game? Rules’ Changes and institutional adaptation at the 
LIBE Committee’, 34:1 Journal of European Integration 2012, p. 55-73. 
24  A. Ripoll Servent, ‘Playing the Co-Decision Game? Rules’ Changes and institutional adaptation at the 
LIBE Committee’, 34:1 Journal of European Integration 2012, p. 55-73, at p. 62. 
25  E. Lopatin, ‘The changing position of the European Parliament on irregular migration and asylum 
under co-decision’, 51(4) JCMS 2013, p. 751-752. 
26  D. Acosta, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: is the European Parliament Be-
coming Bad and Ugly?’, 11 EJML 2009, p. 38-39. 
27  See also F. Trauner & A. Ripoll Servent, ‘The Communitarization of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice: Why Institutional Change does not Translate into Policy Change’, 54(6) JCMS 2016, p. 
1426; R. Parkes, ‘Borders: EU Institutions Fail to Reconcile their Agendas Despite Communitarisa-
tion’, in: F. Trauner & A. Ripoll Servent (eds), Policy Change in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
How EU Institutions Matter, London: Routledge, p. 65. 
28  F. Lutz, The Negotiations on the Return Directive, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2010. 
29  F. Lutz 2010.  
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allowed for qualitative improvements that would not have been made under the con-
sultation procedure. Examples are the exceptions to the obligation to impose a re-entry 
ban, the obligation to provide for free legal aid, the individualized approach with regard 
to determining the risk of absconding, explicit references to the non-refoulement principle, 
the priority given to voluntary return, an express set of rights for illegally staying per-
sons facing return, and special safeguards for minors and their families. 
During the process of adopting amendments, the rapporteur and his shadow rap-
porteurs had an intensive debate in order to reach agreement on some principles which 
were known ‘no-goes’ for the Council, such as an absolute prohibition to remove mi-
nors, suspensive effect of appeals in all cases, a prohibition to return persons to coun-
tries of transit and an absolute prohibition to remove persons if that would worsen 
their medical treatment. Meanwhile, during the Council negotiations, the Member 
States moved towards the enlargement of national discretion and thus minimalizing the 
level of harmonisation. The complete absence of communication between the Council 
and the Parliament facilitated these parallel developments. This did not only delay the 
process but the premature fixing of positions also made it harder to achieve common 
ground. The European Parliament perceived council as ‘repressive’, whereas the Coun-
cil criticized the European Parliament for a ‘lack of realism’. In response to the request 
of Parliament rapporteur Weber to attend some meetings, referring to the presence of 
the Council and Commission representatives at the LIBE committee meetings, the 
Council refused access and continued the non-communication with the Parliament that 
it was used to during the previous consultation procedures.30  
Lutz observed that under consultation the European Parliament tended to adopt 
ambitious and maximalist opinions, but under co-decision there was a division between 
MEPs who wanted to ‘keep their hands clean’ and those who wanted to accept com-
promises in order to avoid failure of negotiations, which would backfire to the Parlia-
ment as well.31 This illustrates that the Parliament also had an institutional interest in 
achieving an agreement with the Council. Although these differences between the 
groups can indeed be observed, it must be noted that for members of the EPP and the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) it was more easy to accept 
compromises as these were close to their position anyhow. As for the left-winged pol-
iticians the gap between their ambitions and the Council positions was much more 
difficult to bridge, and the compromises thus had a higher cost. 
4. Common European Asylum System 
The ordinary legislation procedure also applied to the recast asylum instruments, which 
the Commission proposed as a step for further harmonisation in the framework of the 
Common European Asylum System.32 The main function of the recast was diminishing 
the derogation clauses, which the Member States had managed to negotiate under the 
unanimity rule. As Parliament had not been able to influence the initial instruments, 
                                                        
30  Lutz 2010, p. 19-21.  
31  Lutz 2010, p. 85. 
32  The common European asylum system (CEAS) sets common standards for the treatment of all asylum 
seekers and applications across the EU. 
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which still constituted the pillars of the recast ones, the effect of co-decision on the 
instruments as a whole remained limited. Parliament had to satisfy itself with changes 
of secondary importance, however those changes implied more protection, procedural 
safeguards and solidarity, often supported by successful litigation before the European 
Courts.33  
After the recast of most of the asylum instruments, there was a broad consensus 
that attention for a correct implementation would be the best way forward to reach 
harmonisation. However, the increasing numbers of asylum seekers in 2015 triggered 
the Commission and national political leaders to show they were in control. This led 
to a new wave of legislative proposals, distracting from the implementation process of 
the newly adopted measures. Ironically enough, the Member States could not agree on 
the content, which resulted in a deadlock at the end of the Juncker term. Disagreement 
on reforming the Dublin Regulation (with its relocation mechanism and the strength-
ened responsibility for the Member State of first entrance) and the proposed Asylum 
Procedures Regulation (with its concepts and list of safe third countries) are among the 
main hurdles. The European Parliament on the other hand, managed to adopt a man-
date for negotiations with the Council on seven instruments. One of the strong ele-
ments of the Parliament’s position, shared by Member States like Italy, Greece, Sweden 
and Hungary, was its condition that the instruments were negotiated as a package, 
which prevented the Member States from cherry picking.34 If this requirement would 
not have been applied by the Parliament, it would have risked that repressive tools 
would have been adopted, but that the refugee-friendly instruments such as the reset-
tlement Regulation would have been left out. But it would also have meant that the 
disagreement on the most divisive legislation, namely the Dublin Regulation continues, 
which would prevent the EU from achieving a genuine harmonisation. Here the Par-
liament shows that it is able to use its power and leverage in a strategic way, in favour 
of reaching harmonisation. Political groups in the new Parliament have already ex-
pressed their will to continue its ‘package approach’, and to stick to the positions taken 
by the previous Parliament in order not to create an avenue for re-opening the package. 
This will force the Member States to reach agreement instead of asking the Commis-
sion to present new proposals.  
5. The External Dimension  
Where Member States are not able to agree on the internal EU asylum policy, they find 
each other in focussing on externalising asylum policies through cooperation with third 
countries. In exchange for benefits to those countries, the EU seduces them to streng-
then their border controls and visa rules and to readmit migrants and refugees who 
crossed their territory. The Partnership Framework, presented by the Commission in 
                                                        
33  F. Trauner & A. Ripoll Servent, ‘The Communitarization of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
Why Institutional Change does not Translate into Policy Change’, 54(6) JCMS 2016, p. 1426-1429. See 
also the briefing of the Parliament, ‘European Parliament’s positions on key issues related to asylum 
and migration’, High-Level Conference on Migration Management, 21 June 2017, PE 583.160. 
34  L. Rasche, ‘Breaking the deadlock on the EU asylum front?’ Policy Position 20, December 2018, Ber-
lin: Jacques Delors Institute 2018.  
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2016, aims to adopt tailor made ‘compacts’ with priority partner countries, in which all 
instruments, tools and leverage are put together, ‘to better manage migration in full 
respect of our humanitarian and human rights obligations’.35 Here the principle of con-
ditionality has been put to the centre of the policy, implying that the economic support 
of third countries depends on their performances on readmission and border control. 
The ‘more for more’ principle would therefore be complemented with the ‘less for less’ 
principle and strengthened by the use of all EU policy areas, with the exception of 
humanitarian aid.  
The external dimension of EU migration and asylum policies is not only comple-
mentary to the Common European Asylum System, but also steers the content of its 
legislation. Perhaps the most visible example is the safe third country concept in the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, which is currently discussed in the framework of the 
draft Procedures Regulation. On 22-23 June 2017, the European Council agreed that:  
 
‘in order to enhance cooperation with third countries and prevent new crises, the “safe third 
country” concept should be aligned with the effective requirements arising from the Geneva 
Convention and EU primary law, while respecting the competences of the EU and the Member 
States under the Treaties. In this context, the European Council calls for work on an EU list of 
safe third countries to be taken forward (...). The European Council invites the Council to 
continue negotiations on this basis and amend the legislative proposals as necessary, with the 
active help of the Commission.’36  
 
The expected watering down of the criteria for the designation of a safe third country, 
will further pave the way for the adoption of the EU-Turkey model to other countries 
with even less safeguards for protection, reception and access to society.37 Political 
leaders have clearly shown an interest in concluding similar agreements with Tunisia, 
but also other countries of interest have their attention. 
Apart from these internal legislative elements of the external dimension, it remains 
very difficult for the Parliament to get grip on the externalisation process itself. The 
main cause for that is the weak role of Parliament in foreign policies, where the Council 
acts on the basis of unanimity and is not bound by any position Parliament takes. The 
Lisbon Treaty granted European Parliament explicit competence in the field of 
readmission, as readmission agreements require parliamentary approval. Reslow notes 
that Parliament already exercised influence before, especially by criticising the lack of 
references to human rights instruments in the European Readmission Agreements 
(EURA’s).38 The policy on visa, an important incentive in external cooperation, is also 
governed by formal agreements subject to Parliament’s consent. More influence on the 
external cooperation on migration could make a difference, as Parliament’s narrative is 
                                                        
35  Commission, ‘Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries un-
der the European Agenda on Migration’, COM (2016) 385; T, Strik, ‘Migration deals and responsibility 
sharing: can the two go together?’, in: S. Carrera, T. Strik, J. Santos Vara, Constitutionalising the External 
Dimensions of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2019. 
36  European Council, ‘Meeting of 22-23 June’ (Council document EUCO 8/17, 23 June 2017), Conclu-
sion no. 23. 
37  European Council, ‘EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016’, Press release 144/16. 
38  N. Reslow, Crisis, Change and Continuity: The Role of the European Parliament in EU External Migration Policy, 
paper prepared for the ECPR conference, Hamburg, 22-25 August 2018.  
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based on human rights, whereas the Council is rather led by security concerns.39 This 
is illustrated by Parliament’s 2017 resolution on the role of EU external action in ad-
dressing migration, in which Parliament emphasised the need for a human rights ap-
proach and stipulated that the external action should be guided by the principles on 
which the EU is based, such as democracy and human rights.40 However, I see two 
reasons why this expectation should be tempered. First, due to the tendency towards 
more restrictive positions, a dominant human rights approach by Parliament cannot be 
taken for granted. It approved for instance the EU-Turkey readmission agreement des-
pite pleas from NGOs not to adopt it until the rights of migrants could be guaranteed.41 
Second, most of the instruments concluded with third countries in the framework of 
migration cooperation lack the formal status of an international agreement, which si-
delines the European Parliament. EURAs and Visa Facilitation Agreements are the 
formal elements of a much broader, more comprehensive set of agreements with a 
significant impact despite its legally non-binding nature. The consent of Parliament 
only relates to the more technical outcome of this cooperation, and not to the whole 
EU approach and the reciprocation by the third countries. Parliament has no voice in 
Mobility Partnerships with third countries, although the conditionality principle (coo-
peration on irregular migration in exchange for legal migration) clearly relates to Parli-
ament’s competences on visa and return. It is also not involved in bilateral, regional 
and multilateral dialogues on migration, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP)-EU migration dialogue, the Rabat Process or the Prague Process, in which the 
Commission and the Member States participate.42 The European Parliament however 
decided to take an active role during the negotiations on the Global Compacts on Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees, which may reveal an increasing awa-
reness of the need for parliamentary involvement in international migration policies.43  
Parliamentary Scrutiny of the External Dimension 
Since the large arrival of asylum seekers in 2015, the gap between Council and Parli-
ament has further widened in this area. The Member States increased their intergovern-
mental cooperation in order to tackle the irregular migration through the so-called ‘Bal-
kan-route’. The General Court of the EU ruled that ‘neither the European Council nor 
                                                        
39  A. Maricut, ‘Different narratives, one area without internal frontiers: why EU institutions cannot agree 
on the refugee crisis’, 19(2) National Identities 2017, p. 161-177. 
40  See for instance the European Parliament resolutions, ‘Addressing refugee and migrant movements: 
the role of EU external action’, P_TA(2017)0124 and ‘The situation in the Mediterranean and the need 
for a holistic EU approach to migration’ P8_TA(2016)0102; N. Reslow, Crisis, Change and Continuity: 
The Role of the European Parliament in EU External Migration Policy, paper prepared for the ECPR confer-
ence, Hamburg, 22-25 August 2018. 
41  Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, ‘European Parliament: do not vote on favour of an EU-
Turkey readmission agreement!’, Brussels: EMHRN 2014, http://www.migreurop.org/arti-
cle2476.html?lang=fr. 
42  N. Reslow, Crisis, Change and Continuity: The Role of the European Parliament in EU External Migration Policy, 
paper prepared for the ECPR conference, Hamburg, 22-25 August 2018; see for an overview P. García 
Andrade, P. Martín & S. Mananashvili, EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration, Study for 
the LIBE Committee, PE 536.469, Brussels: European Parliament 2015.  
43  European Parliament resolution of 18 April 2018 on progress on the UN Global Compacts for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees, P8_TA(2018)0118. 
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any other institution of the EU decided to conclude an agreement with the Turkish 
government on the subject of the migration crisis’.44 The European Parliament expres-
sed its concerns about ‘outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey’, as it is ‘not a credible 
long-term solution to the problem’.45 It also expressed its criticism to the form and 
content of the deal.46 The Court approved of this strategy to use the intergovernmental 
framework by denying its competence to rule on the EU-Turkey Statement, despite the 
heavy involvement of the Commission, the Council president and the use of EU funds 
and EU policies as incentives for Turkey to sign the Statement.47 The circumvention 
of the institutional framework of the EU, clearly affecting the necessary checks and 
balances, has not only consequences for the democratic legitimacy but also for the level 
of accountability, including access to justice and fundamental rights.48 These interests 
beg for more competences and scrutiny by the European Parliament. Preferably those 
international instruments, with names like ‘compacts’, ‘the Joint Way Forward’ or ‘Me-
moranda of Understanding’, would have the status of a treaty. But even if this informal 
cooperation continues, Parliament could use its whole ‘toolkit’ in order to get involved 
in this external cooperation. The most logical strategy is to use its formal power to 
become involved in non-legislative instruments. In some instances, Parliament man-
aged to create political linkage of the Return Fund to the Returns Directive. In Spring 
2007, Parliament planned not to release the budget for the first year of the European 
Return Fund in 2008, which created pressure on the Council to agree with certain pro-
cedural safeguards for a humane and dignified treatment of returnees in order to 
achieve an agreement with the Parliament.49 It would be very logical to refrain from 
approving a EURA or Visa-Facilitation Agreement as long as the more comprehensive 
cooperation arrangement with that specific third country has not been discussed and 
agreed upon by Parliament. But with the same purpose, it could also freeze negotiations 
on secondary legislation in case of linkage with the external dimension. This could cre-
ate leverage to demand an ex-ante evaluation of the human rights impact of a migration 
                                                        
44  General Court of the European Union, case nos T-193/16, NG, ECLI:EU:T:2017:129 and T-257/16, 
NM, ECLI:EU:T:2017:130; on 12 September 2018 CJEU declared the appeals against the decisions 
manifestly inadmissible, see C-208/17. 
  ‘The General Court declares that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by 
three asylum seekers against the EU-Turkey statement which seeks to resolve the migration crisis’, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-02/cp170019en.pdf. 
45  European Parliament, 2015 Report on Turkey, P8_TA(2016)0133, Brussel: European Parliament 2015; 
see N. Reslow, Crisis, Change and Continuity: The Role of the European Parliament in EU External Migration 
Policy, paper prepared for the ECPR conference, Hamburg, 22-25 August 2018. 
46  European Parliament, ‘MEPs demand details of the EU-Turkey deal and compliance with interna-
tional law’, Brussels: European Parliament 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20160303IPR16928/meps-demand-details-of-the-eu-turkey-deal-and-compliance-with-inter-
national-law. 
47  Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan – Implementation Report’, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/ 
managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en. 
pdf, accessed 9 November 2017. European Council, ‘EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016’, Press 
release 144/16. 
48  See also J.-P. Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’, 42(4)The 
International Spectator 2007, p. 179-196. 
49  See Lutz 2010, p. 22. 
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deal, combined with the establishment of an independent monitoring system. Parlia-
ment could come up with a set of human rights criteria for such impact assessment and 
monitoring. Using its power of consent to gain influence on external cooperation on 
migration would also be a way to compensate for the absence of a right to initiative, 
which is currently impeding an effective performance. In 2018, the Parliament ma-
naged to agree on the need for humanitarian visa, in order to create safe and legal 
channels for refugees.50 The ever increasing externalisation, which prevents refugees 
from getting access to the EU territory, strengthens the need for such channels. 
However , the Commission and Council could afford not to respond to this resolution. 
Den Hartog and Reslow also point at the scrutiny role of Parliament regarding Funds, 
observing that its budgetary authority has been affected by the emergency mecha-
nisms.51 The Refugee Facility For Turkey was adopted as a Commission decision, and 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) has been established through the 
adoption of a constitutive agreement between Commission and some Member States 
only. Although the EUTF is framed as an emergency instrument, most of its resources 
consist of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is intended to fund long-
term development programmes. In their analyses of the implementation of the Fund, 
OECD and the European Court of Auditors observed that migration control is often 
prioritized above development goals, which underlines the importance of parliamen-
tary scrutiny.52 The increase of the budget for Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF) and Internal Security Fund (ISF) was accompanied by parliamentary scrutiny, 
but the process of adoption happened in a rush, followed by a request from the Com-
mission for urgent approval. The marginal role of Parliament contradicts to its traditi-
onally strong position on the budget, for instance regarding the Multiannual Financial 
Framework. As with other EU programmes, the implementation of these funds requi-
res transparency, monitoring and evaluation, accountability mechanisms, as well as pre-
liminary and ongoing assessments of their impact on fundamental rights. Another 
weakness of the Parliament is that its scrutiny role is divided among different commit-
tees, whereas the external dimension encompasses all policy areas. That the role of 
Parliament is different at every policy area, makes an effective scrutiny extra challen-
ging. As migration control is the main objective of the external dimension, LIBE com-
mittee would be best placed to play a central role in establishing requirements for the 
cooperation, assessing the agreements and monitoring their implementation.  
                                                        
50  European Parliament resolution of 11 December 2018 with recommendations to the Commission on 
Humanitarian Visas, P8_TA(2018)0494. 
51  N. Reslow, Crisis, Change and Continuity: The Role of the European Parliament in EU External Migration Policy, 
paper prepared for the ECPR conference, Hamburg, 22-25 August 2018; L. den Hertog, Money Talks. 
Mapping the funding for EU external migration policy, CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe no. 
95, Brussels: CEPS 2016; L. den Hertog, EU Budgetary Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Reconfiguring the 
Funding Landscape, Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe no. 93, Brussels: CEPS 2016. 
52  OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: European Union 2018, December 2018; European 
Court of Auditors, European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus, special report 
no. 32, Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors 2018. 
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6. Conclusion 
Although the role of the European Parliament on asylum and migration legislation has 
strengthened since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it still struggles to safe-
guard democratic control on European asylum and migration policy in general. The 
choice of Member States to adopt the first generation asylum and migration instru-
ments in a consultation procedure, has created a significant disadvantage for the Parli-
ament. This has its effect up until now, as the subsequent recasts are based on the 
instruments negotiated among the Member States. Another main factor is that Member 
States tend to pursue their aims through intergovernmental cooperation, especially in 
the external cooperation, where the European Parliament has a much weaker position. 
Their tendency to circumvent the institutional framework has its repercussions for the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability of the EU. Another factor affecting effective 
control is that where the Commission previously shared the human rights approach of 
Parliament, it seems to prioritise the objectives of the Member States. Yet, the failing 
of a right to initiative makes Parliament depend on the acceptance of their proposals 
by the Commission. In order to compensate the lack of checks and balances, the Par-
liament needs to be creative as well. It can use its legislative and budgetary powers as a 
leverage to demand involvement and influence on the asylum and migration policies. 
A more comprehensive approach through which all relevant committees cooperate in 
establishing an integral position on the external cooperation, would not only avoid 
fragmented control or the possibility to be played off against each other, but also en-
hance coherence of the EU’s foreign policy. Lastly, the European Parliament could 
also strengthen democratic control by creating more transparency of the decision mak-
ing process. Apart from urging the Council to grant public access to its working docu-
ments (in line with the CJEU jurisprudence), it could also create more openness in the 
trilogue process, for instance by opting for a second reading more frequently. More 
openness would enable civil society to be informed and become a player in the decision 
making process. Taking into account all current hurdles, it is amazing that Elspeth al-
ways manages to respond timely and thoroughly to new developments, and to be so 
influential in this way.  
Dear Elspeth, I am sure that I will benefit from you closely watching EU decision 
making in this field. You are a great source of inspiration to me. Thanks a lot for our 
cooperation at the Radboud University, and I hope we find ample opportunities to 
continue it.  
 
